SDP research papers can be roughly categorized by the different types of pricing that they investigate. We consider 15 such topics here. If you know of a paper we missed, let us know.

Paris metro pricing (6)

Paris metro pricing, inspired by actual pricing used on the Paris metro in the 1980s, is a variant on QoS-aware pricing in that traffic is divided into logically separate classes. However, in Paris metro pricing, the classes are differentiated only in terms of their access prices, not in how the traffic is handled in the network: all classes, though logically separate, are subject to the same access and scheduling policies, etc. The insight of Paris metro pricing is that more expensive traffic classes naturally attract fewer users; they are thus less congested and give users higher QoS, without any explicit QoS provisioning.

Paris metro pricing for the Internet

A. Odlyzko  Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 1999

An abstract is not available.


Pricing and regulating Quality of Experience

S. Wahlmueller, P. Zwickl and P. Reichl  Proceedings of the 8th EURO-NGI Conference on Next Generation Internet, 2012

Counteracting economic challenges in the network industry partially resulting from enormous traffic growth rates and the absence of successful Quality of Service (QoS) mechanisms in practice, we propose a novel concept centering price and quality differentiation on customers' quality perceptions, i.e., Quality of Experience (QoE). By fundamentally building on the known Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) concept we iteratively integrate pricing mechanisms with QoE aspects. Our concept also cardinally incorporates the interests of users, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) offering Internet access, and regulatory bodies-e.g., controlling the fraction of premium service class capacity. Our findings demonstrate the economic desirability for ISPs to apply price discrimination based on QoE considerations. The inclusion of QoE aspects in the traffic classification process, moreover, yields a significant increase of user utilities, while further stimulating the overall demand. This may also prepare the scene for involvements in the Net Neutrality (NN) debate.


Internet service classes under competition

R. Gibbens, R. Mason and R. Steinberg  IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 18(12): 2490—2498, 2000

This paper analyzes competition between two Internet service providers (ISPs), either or both of which may choose to offer multiple service classes. In the model analyzed, a social planner who maximizes the total benefit from network usage and a profit maximizing monopolist will both form multiple service classes; but two networks competing to maximize profits will not. The reason is that a competition effect always outweighs a segmentation effect. Networks wish to offer multiple service classes in order to increase user benefits and hence charge higher prices. In doing so, however, they effectively increase the number of points in the service quality range at which they compete. Consequently, in any equilibrium competitive outcome, both ISPs offer a single service class. The analysis has particular implications for the Paris Metro pricing (PMP) proposal, which is considered in depth in this paper, since it suggests that PMP may not be viable under competition.


A mathematical model of the Paris metro pricing scheme for charging packet networks

D. Ros and B. Tuffin  Computer Networks, 46(1): 73—85, 2004

Pricing has become one of the main challenges of the networking community and is receiving a great deal of interest in the literature. In this paper, we analyze the so-called Paris Metro Pricing scheme which separates the network into different and independent subnetworks, each behaving equivalently, except that they charge their customers at different rates. In our model, each subnetwork is represented by a single bottleneck queue, and the “customers” (data packets) choose their subnetwork taking into account not only the prices, but also the expected delay, which is supposed to have an economic impact. We obtain some necessary and sufficient conditions for the stability of the system; we analyze the problem of maximizing the network revenue and compare it with the case of a single network, and present a multi-application extension of the model. Numerical results illustrating some key aspects of the system are provided throughout the paper.


On the viability of Paris metro pricing for communication and service networks

C.-K. Chau, Q. Wang, and D.-M. Chiu,   Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM, 2010

Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) is a simple multi-class flat-rate pricing scheme already practiced by transport systems, specifically by the Paris Metro at one time. The name is coined after Andrew Odlyzko proposed it for the Internet as a simple way to provide differentiated services. Subsequently, there were several analytical studies of this promising idea. The central issue of these studies is whether PMP is viable, namely, whether it will produce more profit for the service provider, or whether it will achieve more social welfare. The previous studies considered similar models, but arrived at different conclusions. In this paper, we point out that the key is how the users react to the congestion externality of the underlying system. We derive sufficient conditions of congestion functions that can guarantee the viability of PMP, and provide the relevant physical meanings of these conditions.


Analysis of Paris metro pricing strategy for QoS with a single service provider

R. Jain, T. Mullen and R. Hausman  Proceedings of IWQoS, 2001

As the diversity ofI nternet applications increases, so does the need for a variety of quality-of-service (QoS) levels on the network. The Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) strategy uses pricing as a tool to implement network resource allocation for QoS assurance; PMP is simple, self-regulating, and does not require significant communications or bandwidth overhead. In this paper, we develop an analytic model for PMP. We first assume that the network service provider is a single constrained monopolist and users must participate in the network; we model the resultant consumer behavior and the provider’s profit. We then relax the restriction that users must join the network, allowing them to opt-out, and derive the critical QoS thresholds for a profit-maximizing service provider. Our results show that PMP in a single-provider scenario can be profitable to the provider, both when users must use the system and when they may opt out.